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Abstract
Unsold artworks are excluded from a traditional hedonic price index as no observable price
can be attached to them. The question is whether the exclusion of unsold artworks lead to a sample
selection bias in the traditionally constructed art price indices. In this paper, we examine the art
auction sales performance in Turkey for the period between January 2005 and February 2008 using
a unique database which contains 11,212 sales records including unsold items. We employ the
two-stage Heckit model. Our empirical model combines demand-side influences with supply-side
characteristics as well as the auction microstructure. We find that there is no sample selection
bias created by unsold works. This finding also provides an explanation for why the attempts in
the literature to identify which works are (not) sold turned out to be largely unsuccessful. On the
behavioural side, we confirm the existence of the “afternoon effect” in both sales rates and in sales
prices in Turkish art auctions. There is also some evidence for the “death effect” and “master effect”
in both sales rates and sales prices. Finally, we find that the returns in the Turkish art market serve
as a hedge against inflation in our sample period.
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1. Introduction 
 
What determines the successful sale of an individual item in an art auction is no 
easy task to address. The attempts in the literature in this respect focus on the role 
of the pre-auction price range estimates, auction house strategy, and the hedonic 
characteristics of the artwork and the artist. Nevertheless, these attempts have 
been largely unsuccessful. The successful explanation of the determinants of sales 
success of artworks is important not only for a better understanding of the inner 
workings of art auctions, but it also has implications for the unbiased construction 
of art market price indices in the statistical sense. 
In this paper, we examine the art auction market performance in Turkey 
for the January 2005 - February 2008 period using a unique database containing 
11,212 auction records. The sample includes 6,771 sold artworks. The problem 
with many art market price indices in the literature is that they discard unsold 
artworks since an observed sale price cannot be attached to them. However, this 
practice may lead to biased estimates if the unsold and sold paintings are not 
independently distributed. Our study addresses this problem by employing the 
Tobit II sample selection (Heckit) model developed by Heckman (1979) where 
unsold works are treated as unobserved (trunctated) values. The application of the 
Heckit model to auction data is still a largely unexplored research area in the 
economics of art markets.1 
Furthermore, our study includes business survey and consumer confidence 
variables on macroeconomic developments and expectations in addition to the 
hedonic characteristics of auctioned items and the variables capturing the 
auctions’ micro-structure. We also test for the presence of various art market 
anomalies, such as the “afternoon effect”, the “death effect”, and the “master / 
reputation effect” in both sales rates and sales prices.   
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: The potential sample 
selection problem and the determinants of sales prices and sales probability of 
artworks are presented in Section 2. Section 3 discusses the Turkish art market 
and the data used in our study. We present an overview of the Heckit two-stage 
sample selection model in Section 4 and discuss the issues in model construction 
and the explanatory variables. Section 5 presents the estimation results for the 
modified hedonic and the sample selection equations of the Heckit model. Section 
6 compares the results from a conventional hedonic price model that ignores 
unsold paintings with those obtained from the Heckit model in terms of their 
implications for financial returns in the Turkish art market. Section 7 concludes 
the paper. 
 
                                                 
1 See Collins et al. (2009). 
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2. Recent Literature Review on Art Auctions 
 
2.a A Bias due to Unsold Works? 
 
When estimating a traditional hedonic or repeat-sales price index, only the sold 
items are included. There might be a reservation selling price for the unsold works, 
but since this price is unobserved, a price cannot be attached to unsold items in 
the traditional hedonic (and repeat-sales) price indices. The dimension of the 
problem is large since the long term average of  unsold (or “bought-in”) works in 
international art auctions is about 30-35 percent (Artprice, 2010). Whether or not 
the omission of unsold works from the traditionally constructed indices creates a 
sample selection bias, however, depends on the data generating processes for the 
“unsold” and “sold” objects. If they come from independent probability 
distributions, then omitting the unsold works lead to biased results.  
The question of unsold artworks in auctions was noted by Goetzman 
(1996), Goetzmann and Peng (2006), Marinelli and Palomba (2008) and Collins 
et al. (2009). Goetzmann and Peng (2006) argue that in the presence of seller 
reservation prices, transaction prices may provide misleading information 
regarding the demand and supply in markets. They relate the problem to the 
sample selection bias and the probability of unsold items in an auction. Marinelli 
and Palomba (2008) use Heckman’s two-step approach and find that the presale 
evaluations by experts turn out to be a key driver of the sales probability as well 
as the auction price levels. However, they take this finding with scepticism as its 
sufficiency is rejected and some interpretation problems remain. Collins et al. 
(2009) also find evidence for the sample selection bias for a sample of art works 
on 1915 symbolist paintings which went to international auctions during the 
period 1990-2001. Collins et al. (2009) illustrate that art price indices obtained 
under a traditional hedonic model and under a Heckit model show differences due 
to the exclusion of unsold items from the traditional hedonic models. 
The recent evidence focusing on the broader implications of unsold works 
in art auctions brings one’s attention to the determinants of the successful sale of 
an art object in an auction. The Heckit model employed by Collins et al. (2009), 
for instance, requires the specification for the selection equations where the 
factors affecting the sales probability of  an artwork is specified. In what follows, 
we review the literature on the price determinants, sales dynamics and the 
behavioral aspects (including price anomalies) at work in art auctions. 
 
2.b Empirical Evidence on Sales Dynamics of Art Auctions 
 
Given the importance of the distributional relationship between the sold and 
unsold artworks in auctions for the validity of art price indices, it is essential to 
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identify the factors that affect probability of sales success and (if sold) the level of  
sales prices for an artwork in an auction.  
There are various lines of studies in the literature on art auction markets 
that focus on single or multiple factors that examine the factors which influence 
the sales probability, or more generally, the sales price of an artwork.2 They can 
be grouped under the following general themes: 1) Masterpiece effects, 2) Death 
effects, 3) Effects of sales order in auctions (declining price anomaly or the 
afternoon effect),  4) Experts’ pre-sales price estimates, 5) The so-called “burnt” 
or “bought-in” painting effect, 6) Auction house (strategy) effects, and 7) The 
hedonic characteristics of individual artworks, the artists, and the auction houses.  
The widespread notion that the best or more expensive artworks tend to 
generate above average returns is defined as the masterpiece effect. However, 
there is no consensus on its evidence. Pesando and Shum (2008) find mixed 
support for the masterpiece effect in the market for prints for the period 1977-
2004. Mei and Moses (2002), on the other hand, find a negative masterpiece 
effect due to overbidding and mean reversion. Goetzmann (1996) explains this 
effect with the survivorship bias.3 Ginsburgh and Jeanfils (1995) and Campos and 
Barbosa (2009) also find no masterpiece effect.  
In analysing the death effect, Ekelund, Ressler and Watson (2000) focus 
on a possible supply-induced demand-side factor. By making an analogy between 
a durable goods monopolist and an artist, they explain the rise in prices following 
the death of an artist as the expectations on the part of the art buyers concerning 
the future supply of the artists’ works. 
Ashenfelter (1989) and Ginsburgh (1998) show the presence of a declining 
price anomaly in wine auctions and related it to a fatigue effect, i.e., people get 
tired as the auction proceeds and prices decline. Pesando and Shum (1996), and 
Beggs and Graddy (1997) study  this effect on art auctions.4  
Beggs and Graddy (1997) study also the order of sales in art auctions. In a 
theoretical model of an auction with declining valuation, they show that, even in 
the presence of risk-neutral strategic bidders, the bid price to the estimate ratio 
                                                 
2 The literature on various micro aspects of art auctions and the financial returns to art investments 
are surveyed by Ashenfelter and Graddy (2003). 
3 The masterpiece effect is about the fact that the more expensive paintings remain in the sample 
throughout, even if they decreased  in value, whereas less-expensive paintings drop out of the 
sample. However, as Pesando and Shum (2008) argue there should not be masterpiece effect in 
risk-adjusted terms if the art market is efficient. 
4 In a sequential auction of commercial properties, Lusht (1994) finds that prices decline as the 
auction proceeds given that the bidders are either risk-averse or quantity-constrained. Picci and 
Scorcu (2003) do not find any afternoon effect once they employ a dynamic model allowing for 
affiliation, information, or other psychological effects.  
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declines. They also find that ordering heterogenous items by value maximises 
revenue for the auctioneer.5 
Deltas and Kosmopoulou (2004) examine bidding in a rare book 
sequential auction with alphabetically ordered lots where absentee bidders placed 
half of the bids. They disentangle the catalogue effects from those of the 
sequential nature of the sale. They relate catalogue effects to the reduction in the 
attention span of bidders. Towards the end of the catalogue, the attention 
reduction leads them to focus on lots with long descriptions and ignore the lots 
with smaller descriptions. They show that the catalogue effects can also influence 
floor bidder behavior. 
Numerous papers addressed the role of auctioneer pre-sale price estimates. 
There are several questions on this topic, such as: Are the estimates biased? If so, 
do the experts commit systematical errors because they are not efficient? Are the 
biases stable over time? What motivates auctioneers to assign a price spread? For 
instance, a wide estimate window may signal a high estimate of price variance 
and uncertainty and give an indication about the reservation price.6  
Ashenfelter, Graddy and Stevens (2003) address the question of why the 
sales rates differ so dramatically over time and across sections by examining the 
determinants of a seller’s reserve price in a model of sequential search borrowed 
from the empirical search models. They show a strong relationship between sales 
rates and price shocks, as measured by the difference between realised prices and 
auctioneers’ estimates.7 Using a repeat-sales method on impressionist and modern 
art, Beggs and Graddy (2006) identify and estimate lower returns for items that 
fail at auction. They argue that lower returns are due to common value effects, 
changes in the seller’s reserve price, or idiosyncratic downward trends in taste. 
They also find that a smaller spread being positively correlated with the 
probability of unsold items.8  
                                                 
5 Risk-aversion is yet another reason for declining prices according to McAfee and Vincent (1993). 
6 According to Louargand and McDaniel (1991), the efficiency of art market also can be checked 
by examining the experts’ estimates.  
7 Under plausible assumptions, they find that the optimal policy is to set a reserve price that is a 
constant proportion of the current expected price. Furthermore, this constant proportion depends 
only on the variances of the log prices and the seller’s discount rate. They estimate that the reserve 
price in art auctions is set to be between 70 and 80 per cent of the lower estimate of the item. 
8 Bauwens and Ginsburgh (2000) find that Sotheby’s systematically underestimates the expensive 
objects. They test explicitly for the efficiency of the auctioneers’ estimates. They find that experts 
do not seem to take advantage of all the information that is contained in the sales catalogues. 
Ashenfelter (1989) finds that high and low estimates are highly correlated with the actual prices. 
Abowd and Ashenfelter (1988) show that auctioneers’ price estimates are far better predictors of 
prices fetched than hedonic price functions. Chanel et al. (1996) argue that experts provide more 
systematic estimates using all available information on the characteristics of the paintings. 
D’Souza and Prentice (2002) test whether the variance from the regression on actual prices is 
significantly better than the one with the midpoint price estimate of the experts. If it is so, then the 
4
Review of Middle East Economics and Finance, Vol. 7, No. 3 [2011], Art. 2
Another possibility is that auctioneers may manipulate prices for strategic 
purposes. Mei and Moses (2005) examine the relationship between auctioneer 
presale price estimates and the long-term performance of artworks. They find that 
the price estimates for expensive paintings are systematically overestimated over 
more than 30 years. High estimates are associated with subsequently lower returns. 
Furthermore, they show that the estimation errors are quite small but the bias 
could be very large for high-price items. Their results support the strategic 
behavior of auction houses in price manipulation. They also argue that some 
investors are credulous. 
Marinelli and Palomba (2008) and Campos and Barbosa (2009) recently 
attempt at explaining the sales probability of a painting. Marinelli and Palomba 
(2008) introduce experts’ price estimates in a probit model to explain the sales 
probability and the actual price of an item. They find that high price estimates 
decrease the sales probability while increasing the actual price.9  Campos and 
Barbosa (2009) estimate the sales probability and find that the estimate window 
(price range or spread) is negatively and significantly related to the likelihood of a 
“no sale” at auctions. 
 
3. The Turkish Art Market 
 
The Turkish art auction market is rather young but a rapidly developing dynamic 
market. Seçkin and Atukeren (2006, 2009) provide an overview of the Turkish art 
market and its financial dynamics as an investment opportunity. The Turkish art 
scene gained momentum especially in the recent years with the entry of few new 
private art museums such as, Sabancı Museum, Istanbul Modern, Pera Museum, 
and Santral Istanbul. A number of headline events also fuelled the media and 
public interest in the art market. For instance, a painting titled “The Turtle 
Trainer” by Osman Hamdi Bey (1842-1910) was sold for 3.5 million US dollars 
in November 2004. Another work by Osman Hamdi Bey titled “A Lady of 
Istanbul” was sold for 3.4 million pounds in May 2008 in a Sotheby’s auction 
held in London. Furthermore, in March 2009, the first Turkish Contemporary Art 
Auction was organized for 71 works at Sotheby’s London. In November 2009, 
Burhan Doğançay’s painting titled “The Blue Symphony” was sold for 2.2 million 
Turkish lira (about USD 1.5 million) in an auction in Turkey.  
There are no reliable estimates of the size of the art market in Turkey. 
Based only on auction data, the size of the art market is estimated to be about 
                                                                                                                                     
auctioneer appears to estimate prices more systematically. However, the market yields more 
systematic estimates if the regression on actual prices is significantly less predictive.  
9 They find that the name of the artist and his/her living status are relevant but some correction of 
sample selection bias is needed. Their results imply that auction house prestige and the year of sale 
are more important than the physical aspects of the paintings. 
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US$ 10 million in 2000. The Turkish economy suffered a severe banking crisis in 
2001 and the art auction sales proceeds fell to US$ 4.8 million. From 2002 on, a 
rapid increase in the size of the Turkish art auction market was observed. For 
instance, the size of the market reached nearly US$ 20 million in 2005 and 
US$ 51 million in 2007. The global financial crisis also affected the Turkish 
economy and global art auction markets. The decline in the auction sales revenues 
in the Turksih art scene was still relatively moderate, with a decline in the art 
auction sales to US$ 45 million in 2008. More recently, in tandem with the global 
art markets, the Turkish art recovered and the sales amounts reached nearly to 
US$ 90 million in 2010.10 
Given the connection between art markets and the economy, the recent 
developments in the Turkish art market should also be examined in view of 
macroeconomic dynamics. Traditionally, the Turkish economy suffered from 
many years of high inflation. The average consumer price inflation rate during 
1990 – 2002 was about 70 per cent. Following the economic crisis in 2001, 
Turkey experienced high real GDP growth rates and a period of economic 
stabilisation. The annual real GDP growth rates in 2005, 2006, and 2007 were 8.4 
per cent, 6.9 per cent, and 4.5 per cent, respectively. Turkey also made a currency 
reform at the beginning 2005 and dropped six zeros from its currency. The 
exchange rate regime which led to the real appreciation of the Turkish lira after 
the currency reform at the beginning of 2005 has been a major policy anchor in 
achieving macroeconomic stabilisation. During 2005-2008, inflation rates also 
came down substantially. The year-end consumer price inflation rates were 7.7 
per cent in 2005, 9.7 per cent in 2006, 8.4 per cent in 2007, and 10.1 per cent in 
2008. Given the vivid developments in the Turkish art market along with the 
improvements in macroeconomic conditions, the period after the 2001 crisis 
provides a fertile ground studying the dynamics of the domestic art auction 
market in Turkey.  
In this study, we focus on the post-currency reform era. We use a unique 
database that covers the period from January 2005 to February 2008 with a total 
of 11,212 individual auction records – including unsold items.11 The dataset was 
obtained from www.lebriz.com by subscription, screened for incomplete records, 
and processed manually into a database. The auction records include the 
characteristics of the artworks that are brought to an auction for sale, the opening 
price, and the result of the auction, i.e. whether the item is sold or not and the 
sales price if sold. It should be noted that the overall sales rate is about 60.4 per 
                                                 
10 The annual art auction sales figures are based on the information obtained from www.lebriz.com. 
11 The actual number of auctioned works in this period is 12,974. Nevertheless, 1762 records 
contained incomple or unusable information and could not be included in the sample, leaving us 
with 11,212 complete records. 
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cent for the auctions in our sample. There is, however, a large variation. The sales 
rates range from about one-third to around 90 per cent in individual auctions. 
 
4.  A Heckit Model of the Determinants of Sales Probability of Artworks  
 
4.1 Heckit Model 
 
Earlier price indices for the Turkish art market were calculated by Seçkin and 
Atukeren (2006, 2009) – albeit only for paintings for the 1990–2005 period. 
Those indices included the prices of the actually sold items in the auctions. A 
novelty in our analysis is to make use of a full sample of sold and unsold artworks. 
We approach the problem of unsold artworks as censored observations and 
employ the Heckman’s (1979) Tobit II sample selection model. Using this 
framework, we are able to test for the independence of the distributions of the 
unsold and sold paintings and construct a final price index that includes both sold 
and unsold paintings. Furthermore, we compare the outcome from this model with 
the conventional approach that ignores the unsold works. 
The Heckit procedure uses two estimation steps. The sample consists of N 
observations. However, the variable of interest, the sold paintings, is observed 
only for n < N.  The first stage involves the estimation of a probit model to 
explain what leads to a successful outcome (i.e., an item is “sold” in our case). In 
general, this selection equation is expressed in terms of a latent variable zi* that 
depends on one or more explanatory variables wi′ and is given by: 
 
Niuwz iii ,...1
'*     (1) 
 
where N is the sample size, zi* is the latent variable, wi′  is the 1xK vector 
determinants of whether the painting is sold or not, γ is a K-dimensional vector of 
unknown parameters, and ui is a well-behaved random disturbance term.  
Note that we observe the binary outcome (zi) which takes the value of “1” 
when an artwork is sold and “0” otherwise instead of the the latent variable zi*, 
which is not observable. In our context, the estimation results from this stage of 
the Heckit model can also be interpreted as the determinants of the sales success 
of individual artworks. 
The second stage of the Heckit model involves the estimation of a 
modified hedonic model in which yi, the log price of the artworks in our model, is 
the dependent variable. The modified or the augmented model is based on the 
following conditional regression function: 
 
* '( 0) 1,...,i i i iE y z x i n      (2) 
7
Seçkin and Atukeren: A Heckit Model of Sales Dynamics in Turkish Art Auctions
Published by De Gruyter, 2011
where xi′  is the 1xM vector containing the individual characteristics of a painting, 
the painters and the auction houses, and any other relevant information (such as, 
macroeconomic variables and expectations) β is an M-dimensional vector of 
unknown parameters and εi is a well-behaved random disturbance term. The 
additional variable in the model, λi , is the Inverse Mill’s Ratio, IMR, (cf. Verbeek, 
2008: 241, equation 7.84), which is equal to: 
 
)(
)(
'
'


i
i
i
w
w
  
 
where  (.) denotes the standard normal probability density function and Φ(.) 
denotes the cumulative distribution function for a standard normal random 
variable. While λi is not known, we can estimate the parameters vector γ using the 
probit model in the first stage, obtain i~ , and then estimate equation (2).  
Whether the IMR variable turns out to be statistically significant or not is 
a critical point since the consistent estimation of a model that does not include the 
unsold artworks requires the δ parameter to be statistically not different than zero. 
Otherwise, a sample selection bias arises as we would be choosing only the 
successful sales outcomes while there is no statistical basis to exclude the non-
successful outcomes. In other words, the IMR variable created from the first-step 
probit estimation serves as the basis for testing whether the sold and unsold 
artworks come from independent random samples or not. This analysis has 
important implications for the statistical validity of the art market price indices 
that include only the sold items. 
 
4.2. Explanatory Variables 
 
The variables included in our analysis in both stages of the Heckit model can be 
broadly categorised as follows: 1) Auction houses and the seasonal factors; 2) 
Hedonic characteristics of the artwork 3) Hedonic characteristics of the artist; 4) 
Microstructure of the auction; 5) Business and consumer confidence indicators 
based on survey data to capture the anticipations on macroeconomic 
developments and consumer behaviour.  
The seasonal factors and the auction houses are represented by the same 
way as in the previous section. The base seasonal dummy is the third quarter and 
the base auction house dummy is AUC14.  
The hedonic characteristics of the artwork include dummy variables on 
whether: 1) it is signed, 2) it has a title, 3) its production year is known, 4) the 
medium it was made on (of ), 5) the technique used, and 6) the genre of the work. 
In addition, the size of the work in cm2 and the square of the size are included.  
8
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The hedonic characteristics of the artists are captured by dummy variables 
on whether the artist is: 1) alive or not, 2) Turkish or foreign origin, 3) the 
reputation of the Turkish artists, and 4) the known or estimated birthdate of the 
artists. In addition, we also represent artworks created by “anonymous” artists and 
those without sufficient information on the attributions of the artists by dummy 
variables. In view of the literature on the “death effects”, we also consider two 
versions of such effects in our sample.  
In our sample, about 43 per cent of the artists were alive at the time of the 
auction and more than 89 per cent of the artists are Turkish. The reputation of an 
artist is generally an important determinant of the price of an art object (Campos 
and Barbosa, 2009). In order to capture the reputation effects, we divided the 
Turkish artists into two categories: those who are considered to be among the 
“Top 500” artists and others. The selection of who is in the “Top 500” list was 
made according to the expert opinion in Ersoy (2004). According to Ersoy’s 
classification, about 63 per cent of the works in our sample were created by those 
Top 500 Turkish artists. 
In hedonic art market price index models, the usual approach is to denote 
each artist in the sample by a dummy variable. In our case, this approach would 
lead to hundreds of dummy variables and some of them would have only a few 
non-zero values. In view of this, we classified the artists with interaction dummies 
involving their birthdate, whether they are Turkish or foreigners, and the 
reputation of the Turkish artists. The birthdates were grouped into four time 
periods: 1) Born before 1900, 2) Born between 1900 and 1929, 3) Born between 
1930 and 1959, and 4) Born after 1960. This approach led to 12 interaction 
dummy variables. 
As part of the information on the artists, we also test for the death effects. 
The hypothesis for the presence or absence of death effects is whether the sales 
rates for the works made by artists who were deceased in the previous X-months 
or Y-years before the auction date are different than others. We test the death 
effects in two time frameworks. The first one is the immediate effect defined the 
12-month period following the death of an artist. This is the case for 15 artists in 
our sample. The share of works under this variable constitutes about 1.43 per cent 
of the total works in the sample. The second death effect variable takes a 5-year 
horizon. This is the case for additional 17 artists and the share of works under this 
version of the death effect variable makes up about just less than five per cent of 
the total auction records in the sample.  The list of all the variables in these 
categories and their representations in the sample as percentages are presented in 
Table 1.12  
 
                                                 
12 The summary statistics on the hedonic characteristics of the artists are presented in the 
Appendix Table A1. 
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Table 1. Distribution of the Data in the Sample  
( % of the Total for the Category) 
BY SEASONAL 
DUMMIES 
%  BY THE 
MEDIUM OF 
THE 
ARTWORK 
%  BY THE GENRE OF 
THE ARTWORK 
% 
Q1 27.8  Canvas 49.5
5 
 Poster 0.05
Q2 27.3  Others 1.90  Landscape with figure 7.56
Q3 6.3  Paper 15.0
3 
 Abstract (Geometrical) 0.19
Q4 36.7  Wood 1.01  Gravure 0.19
   Carton 13.8
7 
 Sculpture 0.16
By Years %  Cardboard 3.52  Cartoon 0.14
2005 20.6  Hardboard 0.29  Composition 4.80
2006 31.1  Duralite 7.82  Naive  0.05
2007 40.1  Pressed Canvas 1.19  Still life 7.80
2008 (Jan-Feb) 6.4  Plywood 2.60  Nude 2.76
      Orientalist painting 0.06
By Auction 
Houses 
%  By the 
Technique 
Used 
%  Pressing 0.42
Auction House 1 5.8  Oil 68.8
8 
 Self Portrait 0.22
Auction House 2 7.2  Serigraphy 0.77  Landscape 26.93
Auction House 3 27.4  Pressing 0.81  Portrait 4.51
Auction House 4 13.4  Figure (Design) 0.28  Ceramics 0.29
Auction House 5 1.3  Litography 0.36  Abstract 7.49
Auction House 6 2.0  Others 3.54  Abstract Figure 2.32
Auction House 7 11.4  Pencil 1.42  Abstract Composition 6.12
Auction House 8 7.1  Watercolour 7.25  Abstract Landscape 1.03
Auction House 9 1.7  Gouache 3.10  Abstract Portrait 0.27
Auction House 10 8.4  Ink pen 1.10  Unknown / 
Unclassified 
6.86
Auction House 11 5.4  Acryll 3.22  Design 0.32
Auction House 12 1.1  Pastel 1.96  Other 0.12
Auction House 13 4.1  Mixed technique 7.92  Interior 0.86
Auction House 14 3.5  Collage 0.42  Figure 4.69
      Interior with figure 0.89
      Composition with 
figure 
12.88
Note: The totals may not add up to 100 due to rounding. 
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There are hedonic-cum-microstructure models that relate an item’s 
probability of being sold to its characteristics and the auction house strategy. The 
latter part includes the strategy of positioning the item in the auction. That is, the 
most valuable items may neither be the first nor the last items to be auctioned. 
The hypothesis is that the lot order matters. After all, an auction house’s objective 
function is to maximise its sales revenue as the buyer’s and seller’s premiums are 
calculated according to the sales values. From this perspective, it is possible that 
auction houses may not concern themselves as much with general sales rates but 
rather with the sales rates for higher-valued items and/or more competition in bids 
for artworks in general. Still, an auction house should be concerned with its 
general sales rate. First of all, this is related to its reputation in the market. 
Secondly, there is evidence in the literature that unsold paintings (called as 
“bought-in” or “burnt”) in an auction may lose value and affect the longer term 
proceeds for the auction houses.  
We find that the sales rates are the highest for the items positioned in the 
first two deciles of the total works in the auction. The sales rates decline thereafter 
until the middle of the auction, where it increases slightly, but lower sales rates 
follow afterwards. It is also interesting that the sales rate is the lowest in the last 
decile. More generally, there is a decline in the sales rate after the sixth decile. 
This suggests some evidence of an “afternoon effect” in the sales rates. 
We do not have information on the expert estimates for the prices (or the 
expected price range) of the auctioned items in our dataset. Nevertheless, we do 
have the opening prices at the auctions for most of the artworks included in our 
study. The availability of the opening prices allows us to have a closer look at the 
auction house strategy and employ it as a determinant of the auction sales 
performance.  
Figure 1 displays the first, the second, and the third quartile opening prices 
for the auctioned artworks by their relative auction position in terms of deciles.13 
The interpretation is as follows. The opening price at the first quartile for each 
decile by auction position shows the maximum starting price where the bottom 25 
per cent of the auctioned works in that decile were priced. The second quartile 
corresponds to the median price. Given the wide range of prices and outliers 
observed in auctions, the median price should be a better indicator of the general 
price level in an auction than the arithmetic average. The third quartile price is the 
maximum starting price for the 75 per cent of the works auctioned. In other words, 
the opening price at the third quartile shows that 25 per cent of the auctioned 
artworks have opening prices above that price. As such, the price level at the third 
quartile can also act as an indicator of how expensive an auction is compared to 
other auctions.  
                                                 
13 The distribution of the artworks by their position in the auction by deciles and their sales rates 
are presented in Appendix Table A2. 
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Figure 1. Opening Price by Deciles 
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A close look at Figure 1 shows that there is a general tendency for the 
opening prices to increase up to the sixth decile, i.e., the opening prices of the 
auctioned objects increase until 60 per cent of the works are auctioned. Thereafter, 
we see a decline which is especially sharp in the last 20 per cent of the auctions. 
In connection with the sales rates data presented in Table A2, it appears the 
auctioneers start by offering less expensive objects first for which they obtain the 
highest sales rates in the first 20 per cent of the auction, then continue with the 
more expensive items – albeit with lower sales rates. Then, they introduce less 
expensive items towards the end of the auction again – but with lower sales 
success. The decline in the sales rate after 60 per cent of the auction is completed 
despite the decline in the relative price level of the objects again points to an 
“afternoon” or “fatigue” effect, which is especially strong towards the end of the 
auctions. We include such microstructure effects and anomalies in our model.   
The last set of variables in our model capture the consumer confidence and 
business tendency on general economic developments and investment decisions. 
The data were obtained from the Central Bank of the Republic of the Turkey 
(CBRT) online databases.14 The variables employed include the changes in the 
expectations on consumer’s consumption patterns, such as the outlook for 
consumer durables purchases in the current period,  probability of purchasing a 
new car in the next 6 months, probability of purchasing or constructing a new 
                                                 
14 http:\\www.tcmb.gov.tr 
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house within the next 12 months, and the probability of increased savings in the 
next 6 months. The inclusion of consumer confidence variables helps in capturing 
the economic mood in the auctions. Furthermore, the above variables also 
represent complementary or substitution effects to buying artworks, allowing us 
to gain insights about the consumers’/investors’ portfolio choice problem that 
includes artworks. For instance, an increase in the probability of increased savings 
first means that less funds are available and secondly it shows whether buying 
artworks are perceived as an investment alternative. Similarly, if an increase in 
the probability of purchasing a new house in the next six months leads to lower 
sales rates of art objects, this may be interpreted as a substitution effect due to the 
competing use of available funds. On the other hand, a positive relationship might 
indicate that house purchases and artworks are complementary goods: e.g., those 
who buy new houses also may also have a tendency to buy artworks to decorate 
them. 
 
5. Estimation Results 
 
5.1 The Heckit  – Modified Hedonic Price Model 
 
The estimation results from the two-step Heckit model for our sample of sold and 
unsold artworks in Turkish art auctions are presented in Table 2 – Panel A.15 The 
alternative estimates from the traditional hedonic price model are also presented 
in Table 2 – Panel B. The dependent variable is the log(sales price) in current 
Turkish liras. The number of observations is 6,771. Note that the models (except 
for the selection equation for the Heckit model) do not include a constant term 
since the full set of time-period dummies are employed.  
The main results of the hedonic determinants of the Turkish art market 
prices within our Heckit model can be summarised as follows.  
1) The medium of the artwork: Works made on plywood and on “other” materials 
sell for more than those made on wood. There is also a premium to “oil on 
canvas” works over works on wood, but no premium to canvas if the work is not 
made using oil.  On the other hand, works made on paper and carton sell for a 
significantly less amount than works made on wood. This can be interpreted as a 
durability premium. 
2) Technique used: Works made by using oil (even if it is not on canvas)  and 
works involving gouache and mixed techniques sell for significanty more than the 
works made by various types of pencil works. Nevertheless, the artworks made by 
using serigraphy, pressing, watercolour, ink, and other techniques sell for lower 
prices than those made by pencil.  
                                                 
15 Table 2 is placed at the end of the paper under “Estimation Results” due to its length. 
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3) Genre effect: The genre effect helps to capture the tastes. We find evidence that 
the genre of the artwork matters. For instance, the works depicting interiors, 
interiors with figure, landscape with figure, orientalist paintings, and sculptures 
are more likely to sell for a higher price than “still life”. On the other hand, 
abstract landscape, ceramics, and cartoons sell for a lower price than still life 
motives.  
4) Other attributes of the artwork: We have further evidence that the larger-sized 
works sell for higher prices but the negative coefficient of the square of the size 
variable indicates diminishing returns to the increases in the size of an art object. 
This is an established result in the literature. Furthermore, the works with a title 
and those whose production are known sell for more. However, we did not find an 
additional effect if the work is also signed by its artist.  
5) Auction position: Our estimation results support the opening price-auction 
position relationship in the selling prices as well. The objects initially placed 
amongst the first 30 per cent of the total number of works to be auctioned have 
lower selling prices compared to those auctioned in the fifth decile. Then, the 
selling prices of the auctioned objects increase (compared to those in the fifth 
decile) until the eighth decile. The last 10 per cent of the objects to be auctioned 
have again lower selling prices. Note that this is also in line with the “afternoon 
effect” or the “fatigue effect” in the literature.  
6) Attributes of the Artist: We find that prices of the works by the new generation 
of both Turkish and foreign artists born after 1960 have lower sales prices than 
the others. An exception is for the Turkish artists who were born after 1960 and 
who are considered to be among the top 500 have higher selling prices than the 
Turkish artists born after 1960 but who are not among the top 500. This indicates 
a “reputation effect” for the new generation artists. Among the other attributes of 
the artists, we find that the works by currently active (alive) artists (Turkish or 
foreign) have lower sales prices.  
7) Death effect: Our estimates indicate that there is some death effect premium in 
the prices of the works by recently deceased artists. First, the prices of the works 
by artists who died in the previous 12 months of the auction date are found to be 
statistically higher but the effects reverses as more time (e.g., five years) passes. 
8) Consumer and business confidence: We tried different consumer / business 
confidence and expectations on economic developments variables in our 
specifications and found that the expections for a better outlook for consumer 
durables and new car purchases are reflected as more optimistic mood in the art 
auction markets, leading to higher prices. On the other hand, when the mood is on 
the increased savings side, the art market prices also suffer from diminished 
confidence. Interestingly, we also find that when the probability of purchasing or 
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constructing a new house within the next 12 months increases, art markets suffer. 
This shows some substitution effect – making less funds available for art market 
purchases.  
As discussed earlier, the key variable in a two-step Heckit model is the 
lambda parameter. In our case, the lambda has a negative sign (-0.2126) but it is 
not statistically significant at conventional levels.16 This evidence indicates that 
there is not any sample selection for what is sold (or, symmetrically unsold). It 
could still be that all of the paintings could be drawn independently from the same 
distribution, or alternatively, all of the paintings are from independent 
distributions.17 The implication is that the earlier hedonic price indices on the 
Turkish art market based only on sold paintings are unbiased. 
The correlation coefficient between the error distributions of the sold and 
unsold works is -0.215. Again, it is not statistically significant, but the negative 
coefficient on the lambda estimate (along with the negative correlation 
coefficient) implies that the price index that would include the unsold works 
would lead to lower return estimates. 
 
5.2 Interpreting the Results from the Heckit Sample Selection Equation  
 
Table 2 also presents the estimates for the sample selection equation. Note that 
this part of the model might also provides insights into the determinants of sales 
success for the auctioned artworks since the explained variable in the selection is 
an artwork’s probability of being sold in an auction. Yet, we present the results 
from this stage as a preliminary look into what inner dynamics of art auctions and 
discuss only some of the findings. Further research is needed to obtain a fuller 
picture.   
The dataset covers 11,212 artworks auctioned during the January 2005 - 
February 2008 period. The dependent variable is SOLD, which takes the value of 
“1” if an item is recorded as sold and “0” otherwise. The mean of the dependent 
variable, that is the overall sales rate in the estimation sample, is 60.4 per cent. 
An important empirical problem in two-step Heckit models is to determine 
what variables should be in the selection equation (probit model) and in the least-
squares estimation (hedonic model). What is at stake is whether the final model is 
                                                 
16 Collins et al. (2009) also use a Heckit model to test for the effects of a potential sample selection 
bias in art price indices. Their results do indicate a difference between the tradition hedonic index 
and the constructed from a Heckit model. While this should indicate a statistically significance 
lambda value, Collins et al. (2009) do not provide this information and instead conduct an F-test 
for the equality of the coefficients from the hedonic model versus the Heckit model estimates. 
Nevertheless, as our findings in Section 6 show, there might be differences between the price 
indices from the hedonic and the Heckit models, yet the lambda value is statistically insignificant.  
17 We thank an anonymous referee for suggesting these possibilities. 
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statistically identified or not. In the case where the selection equation and the 
second-step modified hedonic price model equation contain exactly the same 
variables, the final model is identified only if the errors terms are normally 
distributed. This is a strong assumption. Ideally, the identification should be 
obtained by including additional variables in the selection equation rather than 
using a subset of the second step model. (See Verbeek, 2008: 240 - 243 for a further 
discussion of the sample selection model and the problems associated with it.)  
In our empirical set-up, the price determinants and the sales probabilities 
of auctioned artworks are related and they do overlap but they are not exactly the 
same. In particular, we employ the same set of explanatory variables for the 
hedonic price model described above; but, in order to make sure that the model is 
identified, we also include additional variables among the explanatory variables 
of the sample selection model such as the auction microstructure and further 
variables on consumer’s expectations.  The estimation results for the some 
specific groups of variables in our analysis are as follows. 
1) Nationality-Reputation-Birthdate interaction dummy variables. For Turkish 
painters, the baseline dummy is taken as those with birthdates after 1960 and who 
are not listed in the top 500 Turkish artists. We find that the works by all of the 
top 500 (both older and newer generations) artists have higher sales rates than the 
baseline category. Nevertheless, for those who are not among the top 500 list, 
only the works made by those born between 1930 and 1960 have higher sales 
probability. For the artists with foreign origin, the baseline dummy is again those 
born after 1960. It is found that the works by those born before 1900 and those 
born between 1930 and 1960 have a higher probability of sales. Overall, these 
results show that there is a “master” effect. A similar effect might also be at work 
for the foreign artists. 
2) Death effects. As disccussed earlier, we included two measures for the death 
effects. We estimate a higher probability of sales for the works of an artist who 
died within the 12 period prior to the auction. Nevertheless, when the period is 
extended to five years, the effect disappears. These findings indicate that the 
presence of a death effect in Turkish art auction sales rates is limited to the short-
term. 
3) Sales order in the auction. We tried to capture the microstructure of the 
auctions by assigning a dummy variable for the positioning of an item in the 
auction in deciles. The baseline dummy is taken as those auctioned in the fifth 
decile. The estimation results are in line with the sales rates per decile presented 
in Table 2. The art objects positioned at the beginning of the auction (the first 20 
percent to be auctioned) have statistcally higher sales rates than those in the fifth 
decile. Furthermore, the last 10 per cent of the works to be auctioned have lower 
sales rates than those positioned in the fifth decile. Looking at these results in 
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view of the opening prices of the auctioned objects as shown in Figure 1, we can 
conclude that the cheaper items have higher sales probability at the beginning of 
the auction while this is not the case at the end of the auction. This finding can be 
seen as evidence of a “fatigue” or an “afternoon effect” in art auction sales rates 
in Turkey.    
4) Consumer and business confidence. The expectations on improving economic 
conditions in the next three months, improvements in outlook for purchases of 
consumer durables and new cars, the rise of stock prices, the improvements in 
outlook, and a higher probability of buying a new house compared to 3 months 
ago are all found to increase the sales probability. Thus, we find a complementary 
relationship between consumer durables, cars, houses, and artworks. This is an 
important result. The possibility of such complemantarity effects is widely 
acknowledged but no quantitative support has been provided for this hypothesis 
so far.  
 
6. Comparison of the Heckit-based Turkish Art Market Price Index with the 
Traditional Hedonic Price Model based on Sold Works Only  
 
In order to construct the price indices, the coefficient estimates on the time-period 
dummies are used. The period-over-period changes in the price index can be 
calculated from e(βt- βt-1)-1. Using the Heckit model estimates, the percentage 
change in the price index from 2005H2 to 2005H1 is (e(5.42243-5.22516)-1)*100, which 
is equal to about 23 per cent. Table 3 presents the estimated changes in the 
Turkish art auction market prices in semi-annual frequency.  
 
Table 3.  Comparison of the Results: Price Developments  
in The Turkish Art Market 
 Coefficients  % change Index 
Period Hedonic Heckit Period Hedonic Heckit Hedonic Heckit 
      100 100
2005H1 5.07975 5.22516 2005H1 14.75(*) 14.75(*) 114.75 114.75
2005H2 5.28676 5.42243 2005H2 22.9995 21.8073 141.14 139.77
2006H1 5.2475 5.34795 2006H1 -3.8499 -7.1774 135.71 129.74
2006H2 4.98422 5.07774 2006H2 -23.1473 -23.6781 104.30 99.02
2007H1 5.57242 5.73949 2007H1 80.0744 93.8181 187.81 191.92
2007H2 5.55379 5.72664 2007H2 -1.8458 -1.2768 184.34 189.47
2008 
 (Jan-Feb) 5.47374 5.45233 
2008 
 (Jan-Feb) -7.6930 -23.9904 170.16 144.02
(*) The figure is derived from Seçkin and Atukeren’s (2009) calculations. 
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The overall picture in Table 3 is that the price changes or the returns in the 
Turkish art market were volatile on a semi-annual frequency between January 
2005 and February 2008. Starting at 100 at the beginning of 2005, the hedonic 
price based on sold works only reached the level of 170.16 in February 2008, 
whereas according to the Heckit model, the level of the Turkish art market price 
index in February 2008 was 144.02. This is an expected result as the unsold items 
can be seen as having implied prices which did not reach the level of the 
reservation prices of the sellers. However, the difference should not be considered 
significant since the lambda coefficient in the Heckit model did not turn out to be 
statistically different than zero at conventional levels. Another way to analyse the 
returns is to look at them as annualised figures. They can be calculated by using 
the price index level data at each period and by converting them to annualised 
figures, which are shown in Table 4. For instance, the annualised return in 
2007H1 is ((189.47/100)(1/5))2*100 = 29.79 per cent per annum. 
 
Table 4. Annualised Returns In The Turkish Art Auction Market (%) 
 
Time Period Traditional Hedonic Model 
(Sold Works Only) 
Heckit Model  
(Sold and Unsold  
Works) 
2005H1 31.68 31.68 
2005H2 41.14 39.77 
2006H1 22.58 18.96 
2006H2 2.13 -0.49 
2007H1 28.67 29.79 
2007H2 22.61 23.74 
2008(Jan-Feb) 16.40 10.98 
Source: Own calculations based on the estimated coefficients from the Hedomic and Heckit 
models presented in Table 2. 
 
Accordingly, Table 4 shows that, for the overall period from January 2005 
to February 2008, the returns in the Turkish art auction market were about 16.4 
per cent per annum according to the traditional hedonic price model while the 
returns were 10.98 per cent per annum according to the Heckit model. The 
consumer price inflation and the whole price inflation are 8.9 and 7.6 per cent per 
annum for the corresponding period.  Hence, the art market in Turkey can be said 
to have served as a hedge against inflation during that period. This is in line with 
the previous finding on the Turkish art market (Seçkin and Atukeren, 2006, 2009). 
It should be also noted that the prices or the returns in the Turkish art market were 
also negatively affected by the world economic crisis from the second half of 
2007 on. 
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7. Conclusions  
 
This study examines the art auction performance in Turkey for the period between 
January 2005 and February 2008 using a unique database which contains 11,212 
auctions records. Our analysis incorporates the unsold works into the analysis by 
means of the two-step Heckit model. The key variable in a two-step Heckit model 
is the lambda variable (i.e., the Inverse Mill’s Ratio). Our estimation results yield 
a negative but statistically insignificant parameter estimate for the lambda 
variable in the Heckit model. Hence, we conclude that the exclusion of unsold 
paintings does not lead to biased estimates. Nevertheless, as the estimate of the 
lambda parameter is negative, the point estimates of the returns obtained under 
the Heckit model are lower. For instance, for the overall period from January 
2005 to February 2008, the returns in the Turkish art auction market were about 
16.4 per cent per annum according to the traditional hedonic price model while 
the returns were about 11 per cent per annum according to the Heckit model. The 
consumer price inflation and the whole price inflation are 8.9 and 7.6 per cent per 
annum for the corresponding period. In both cases, the art market in Turkey can 
be said to have served as an inflation hedge during that period.  
Our model also allows us to test for a number of behavioral aspects in art 
auctions. For instance, we indeed find that the art objects positioned at the 
beginning of the auction (the first 20 percent to be auctioned) have statistically 
higher sales rates than those in the fifth decile. Furthermore, the last 10 per cent of 
the works to be auctioned have lower sales rates than those positioned in the fifth 
decile. Hence, we can conclude that the cheaper items have higher sales 
probability at the beginning of the auction while this is not the case towards the 
end of the auction. This finding can be seen as evidence of a fatigue or an 
afternoon effect in art auction sales rates in Turkey. A similar effect is also found 
in sales prices.  
Regarding the characterictics of the artists, our results demonstrate a 
reputation effect in sales rates for the Turkish artists who are considered to be 
among the top 500 according to expert opinion. We have found evidence for death 
effects in both sales rates and in art prices.  Nevertheless, the presence of a death 
effect in Turkish art auction sales rates is limited to the short-term. Regarding the 
death effect in art market prices, we again find that that there is some death effect 
premium in the prices of the works by artists who passed away in the previous 12 
months of the auction date. 
Furthermore, using business and consumer survey data to capture the role 
of macroeconomic developments and expectations and consumers’ choice-
theoretic decisions in explaining art market buying behaviour, we find that the 
expectations for a better outlook for consumer durables and new car purchases 
also reflect themselves as stronger mood in the art auction markets, leading to 
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higher prices. On the other hand, when the mood is on the increased savings side, 
the art market prices also suffer from diminished confidence. In the case of the 
relationship between stock market performance and prices in the art markets, the 
literature documents a linkage through wealth effects. Our study also establishes 
the wealth effects link in the form of higher auction sales rates as well. Our 
estimation results also indicate that an increase in the probability of increased 
savings leads to a decline in art market sales rates. This result is in line with the 
expectations that people defer their purchases of superior goods in times of 
economic restraint.  
 
ESTIMATION RESULTS 
 
Table 2.  Two-Step Heckit Model versus the Traditional Hedonic Price 
Model Estimates 
 
Two-step Heckit estimates using 6771 observations 
Dependent variable: log(Sale Price) 
Heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors 
 Panel A Panel B 
 Heckit Model Traditional  
Hedonic Price Model 
  Coefficient z-score Sig. Coefficient z-score Sig.
Semi-Annual Time Dummies 
2005H1 5.22516 14.71 *** 5.07975 30.03 *** 
2005H2 5.42243 15.17 *** 5.28676 32.52 *** 
2006H1 5.34795 16.59 *** 5.2475 33.69 *** 
2006H2 5.07774 14.25 *** 4.98422 30.03 *** 
2007H1 5.73949 15.94 *** 5.57242 35.43 *** 
2007H2 5.72664 16.6 *** 5.55379 34.56 *** 
2008(Jan.-Feb.) 5.45233 17.05 *** 5.47374 24.67 *** 
Auction Houses (Base category Auction house 14) 
Auction House 1 1.7614 10.87 *** 1.80856 17.06 *** 
Auction House 2 1.07069 6.467 *** 1.07664 10.88 *** 
Auction House 3 0.900473 5.771 *** 0.899128 9.846 *** 
Auction House 4 1.92444 9.509 *** 1.92073 20.14 *** 
Auction House 5 1.4232 7.506 *** 1.31666 9.792 *** 
Auction House 6 0.946371 5.394 *** 0.83949 6.859 *** 
Auction House 7 1.30156 8.214 *** 1.25394 13.38 *** 
Auction House 8 1.32438 6.964 *** 1.40055 15.2 *** 
Auction House 9 -0.574753 -2.937 *** -0.813837 -4.949 *** 
Auction House 10 1.35027 7.879 *** 1.29466 13.42 *** 
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Auction House 11 0.998188 6.4 *** 0.975434 10.01 *** 
Auction House 12 0.529036 2.606 *** 0.490324 2.889 *** 
Auction House 13 1.03734 6.103 *** 1.01465 9.623 *** 
Medium of the Artwork (Base category = Wood) 
Paper -0.325696 -4.28 *** -0.407867 -5.744 *** 
Carton -0.243664 -3.045 *** -0.293902 -3.798 *** 
Cardboard -0.0797981 -0.8098  -0.158769 -1.599  
Hardboard 0.224747 0.9728  0.23027 1.035  
Duralite -0.116447 -1.303  -0.191824 -2.264 ** 
Pressed Canvas 0.0456445 0.3297  -0.0128627 -0.1004  
Plywood 0.181489 1.704 * 0.0495575 0.4734  
Other materials 0.316593 2.592 *** 0.240563 1.872 * 
Canvas (Oil technique) 0.418734 4.267 *** 0.340909 3.65 *** 
Canvas (Not Oil 
technique) -0.010197 -0.08771  -0.15085 -1.462  
Technique Used (Base category = Pencil) 
Oil not on Canvas 0.251644 3.13 *** 0.286949 3.89 *** 
Watercolor  -0.236926 -2.912 *** -0.17444 -2.361 ** 
Gouache  0.567001 6.384 *** 0.650844 7.33 *** 
Ink  -0.256957 -1.897 * -0.169114 -1.684 * 
Acyrll  -0.0373156 -0.3118  0.0228337 0.2188  
Pastel -0.0607289 -0.5306  -0.0717074 -0.6532  
Mixed Technique 0.185343 2.448 ** 0.217969 3.234 *** 
Collage 0.180462 1.083  0.34484 2.181 ** 
Serigraphy -0.786295 -4.335 *** -0.787713 -4.583 *** 
Pressing -0.75483 -3.878 *** -0.844631 -5.531 *** 
Design -0.04508 -0.1581  -0.0268934 -0.1335  
Litography 0.118738 0.5212  0.244257 1.172  
Other -0.206381 -1.888 * -0.0627712 -0.6206  
Genre of the Artwork (Base cateory = Still Life) 
Poster 0.550163 0.7743  0.432889 1.316  
Print -0.457411 -2.007 ** -0.466067 -2.432 ** 
Unknown 0.521252 1.63  0.212712 1.702 * 
Design -0.687491 -2.639 *** -0.703614 -3.857 *** 
Other 0.234032 0.4652  -0.0522141 -0.05864  
Interior 0.372075 2.916 *** 0.35976 2.246 ** 
Figure -0.0284129 -0.4129  -0.0658655 -1.012  
Interior with Figure 0.512991 4.013 *** 0.579265 4.176 *** 
Composition with Figure 0.172541 3.099 *** 0.147278 2.854 *** 
Landscape with Figure 0.252238 4.129 *** 0.205191 3.698 *** 
Geometrical Abstract 0.237532 0.8159  0.16571 0.7515  
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Gravure 0.543777 1.071  0.48937 0.5025  
Sculpture 0.850337 2.996 *** 0.811218 4.179 *** 
Cartoon -0.484865 -1.66 * -0.0349357 -0.2016  
Composition -0.0284496 -0.4109  -0.0418224 -0.6611  
Naïve 0.202911 0.289  0.0149988 0.01646  
Nude 0.0099263 0.1191  0.0358119 0.505  
Orientalist Painting 1.18852 1.692 * 1.42997 1.433  
Self-Portrait 0.158727 0.6131  0.0879753 0.3054  
Landscape 0.0352218 0.707  0.0282346 0.5958  
Portrait 0.0510153 0.6981  0.0235755 0.3264  
Ceramics -8.22E-01 -3.671 *** -0.608102 -3.295 *** 
Abstract -8.58E-02 -1.337  -0.125675 -2.063 ** 
Abstract Figure 3.88E-02 0.4095  0.0782746 0.9379  
Abstract Composition 0.0319816 0.4567  0.0258041 0.4169  
Abstract Landscape -0.339443 -2.497 ** -0.300248 -2.132 ** 
Abstract Portrait 0.0204336 0.08842  0.0926026 0.4683  
Other Atrributes of the Artwork 
Size (cm2) 8.64E-05 19.08 *** 0.00011659 21.38 *** 
Size-squared -1.06E-09 -10.46 *** -2.29E-09 -13.4 *** 
Production year known 
= 1 0.120743 4.33 *** 0.0675612 2.683 *** 
Sıgned = 1 0.0356594 0.6081  0.0661523 1.278  
Titled = 1 0.22405 7.426 *** 0.236256 9.149 *** 
Position in the Auction 
Decile 1 -0.621191 -10.92 *** -0.564382 -12.35 *** 
Decile 2 -0.281362 -5.15 *** -0.253291 -5.718 *** 
Decile 3 -0.186645 -3.382 *** -0.225176 -4.566 *** 
Decile 4 0.0436247 0.7811  0.0494079 1.009  
Decile 6 0.107403 1.918 * 0.0868463 1.606  
Decile 7 0.124665 2.221 ** 0.124585 2.328 ** 
Decile 8 0.185452 3.371 *** 0.172825 3.279 *** 
Decile 9 -0.0462875 -0.8525  -0.0100043 -0.1906  
Decile 10 -0.315106 -5.243 *** -0.330102 -6.476 *** 
Artist: Turkish / Foreign, Reputation, Birthdate period 
Top500 Turkish artist, 
Born before 1900 1.73282 18.31 *** 1.69822 21.67 *** 
Top500 Turkish artist, 
Born between 1900-1929 1.28617 14.86 *** 1.28667 19.2 *** 
Top500 Turkish artist, 
Born between 1930-1959 0.851637 10.61 *** 0.873242 14.09 *** 
Top500 Turkish artist, 
Born after 1960 0.163884 1.29  0.210795 2.78 *** 
Non-Top500 Turkish 
artist, Born before 1900 1.22829 12.15 *** 1.18653 12.94 *** 
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Non-Top500 Turkish 
artist, Born between 
1900-1929 0.562831 5.582 *** 0.601641 7.652 *** 
Non-Top500 Turkish 
artist, Born between 
1930-1959 0.453057 5.272 *** 0.471073 6.67 *** 
Foreign artist born 
before 1900 1.40576 14.25 *** 1.33954 15.17 *** 
Foreign artist born 
between 1900-1929 0.507299 2.837 *** 0.397676 2.517 ** 
Foreign artist born 
between 1930-1959 0.931466 6.336 *** 1.04082 7.944 *** 
Other Atrributes of the Artist 
ALIVE = 1 -0.514906 -12.81 *** -0.478656 -14.2 *** 
Insufficient artist info 0.432104 1.46  0.185232 0.4779  
Unknown birthdate 
period -0.0808769 -0.2845  -0.119053 -0.3793  
Death Effect 
Artist died within the 
previous 12 months of 
the the Auction date 0.24706 2.118 ** 0.441692 3.754 *** 
Artist died within the 
past  5 years of  the 
Auction date -0.308922 -4.414 *** -0.368529 -5.013 *** 
Economic Expectations 
Outlook for Consumer 
Durables purchases in 
the current period, 3 
Mo. % change  0.0284498 4.7 *** 0.0303887 5.603 *** 
Probability of purchasing 
a new car in the next 6 
months, 3 mo. % change 0.0791432 2.593 *** 0.0624836 2.3 ** 
Probability of purchasing 
or constructing a new 
house within the next 12 
months, YoY % change  -0.118557 -4.681 *** -0.116012 -4.943 *** 
Probability of increased 
savings in the next 6 
months, 3 mo. % change -0.0438644 -4.695 *** -0.041532 -5.114 *** 
Inverse Mills Ratio 
Lambda -0.212575 -1.192     
 
Selection Equation for the Heckit Model 
 
 Coefficient z-score Significance level 
Constant -1.55217 -7.489 *** 
 
Auction Houses (Base category Auction house 14) 
Auction House 1 0.609685 3.324 *** 
Auction House 2 0.58344 3.278 *** 
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Auction House 3 0.574543 3.329 *** 
Auction House 4 1.44035 8.35 *** 
Auction House 5 0.975547 5.024 *** 
Auction House 6 0.184246 0.9012  
Auction House 7 0.535154 3.041 *** 
Auction House 8 1.10267 6.16 *** 
Auction House 9 0.355155 1.773 * 
Auction House 10 0.674975 3.733 *** 
Auction House 11 0.561129 3.168 *** 
Auction House 12 0.118345 0.5683  
Auction House 13 0.777607 4.58 *** 
Seasonal Dummies 
Q1 0.425168 4.646 *** 
Q2 0.205491 2.574 ** 
Q4 0.0297268 0.3848  
Medium of the Artwork 
Paper  0.146389 1.783 * 
Carton 0.154489 1.846 * 
Cardboard 0.117164 1.101  
Hardboard 0.287563 1.152  
Duralite 0.238389 2.561 ** 
Pressed Canvas 0.342251 2.426 ** 
Plywood 0.195334 1.748 * 
Other materials 0.145852 1.137  
Canvas (Oil technique) 0.224609 2.324 ** 
Canvas (Not oil 
technique) 0.495928 4.155 *** 
Technique Used 
Oil not on Canvas -0.0197909 -0.2501  
Watecolor 0.126184 1.567  
Gouache 0.120842 1.317  
Ink 0.0023812 0.01806  
Acyrll -0.386592 -3.296 *** 
Pastel 0.0993981 0.8425  
Mixed Technique 0.0473068 0.6378  
Collage 0.266836 1.386  
Serigraphy  -0.113897 -0.7052  
Pressing 0.288131 1.596  
Design -0.299084 -1.231  
Litography 0.414978 1.863 * 
Other 0.200116 1.838 * 
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Genre of the Artwork 
Poster -0.568959 -1.036  
Print -0.380344 -1.887 * 
Unknown -1.95557 -21.38 *** 
Design -0.428151 -1.949 * 
Other -0.436328 -0.9493  
Interior 0.0189635 0.1317  
Figure 0.0419707 0.5499  
Interior with Figure 0.381608 2.369 ** 
Composition with Figure  0.0516633 0.8415  
Landscape with Figure  0.037966 0.5557  
Geometrical Abstract -0.415398 -1.546  
Gravure -0.716288 -1.95 * 
Sculpture 0.445628 1.103  
Cartoon 0.668909 1.693 * 
Composition 0.0392691 0.5221  
Naïve -1.07863 -2.003 ** 
Nude -0.00384961 -0.04355  
Orientalist Painting 0.525695 0.8344  
Self-Portrait 0.101591 0.3669  
Landscape -0.0794392 -1.493  
Portrait -0.10171 -1.334  
Ceramics 7.02E-01 2.515 ** 
Abstract -5.40E-02 -0.7883  
Abstract Figure -1.68E-01 -1.743 * 
Abstract Composition  3.12E-02 0.4115  
Abstract Landscape -0.257012 -1.93 * 
Abstract Portrait 0.561772 2.126 ** 
Other Atrributes of the Artwork 
Size (cm2) 6.26E-06 1.287  
Size-squared -1.09E-10 -1.027  
Production year known 
= 1 0.0395518 1.345  
Signed = 1 0.238747 4.395 *** 
Titled = 1 0.121735 3.999 *** 
Position in the Auction 
Decile 1 0.18642 3.129 *** 
Decile 2 0.157668 2.694 *** 
Decile 3 0.0629222 1.064  
Decile 4 0.0701778 1.173  
Decile 6 -0.00808197 -0.1339  
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Decile 7 0.00037622 0.006204  
Decile 8 -0.0442985 -0.754  
Decile 9 -0.046533 -0.8073  
Decile 10 -0.238154 -4.112 *** 
Artist: Turkish / Foreign, Reputation, Birthdate Period 
Top500 Turkish artist, 
Born before 1900 0.318128 3.432 *** 
Top500 Turkish artist, 
Born between 1900-1929 0.312474 3.782 *** 
Top500 Turkish artist, 
Born between 1930-1959 0.249758 3.278 *** 
Top500 Turkish artist, 
Born after 1960 0.29418 2.258 ** 
Non-Top500 Turkish 
artist, Born before 1900 0.0432679 0.4256  
Non-Top500 Turkish 
artist, Born between 
1900-1929 0.122686 1.23  
Non-Top500 Turkish 
artist, Born between 
1930-1959 0.186914 2.213 ** 
Foreign artist born 
before 1900 0.253578 2.566 ** 
Foreign artist born 
between 1900-1929 -0.109786 -0.6692  
Foreign artist born 
between 1930-1959 0.346969 2.179 ** 
Other Attributes of the Artist 
ALIVE = 1 0.138561 3.283 *** 
Unknown birthdate 
period -0.124081 -0.4188  
Insufficient artist info 0.10262 0.3344  
Death Effect 
Artist died within the 
previous 12 months of 
the the Auction date 0.378547 2.842 *** 
Artist died within the 
past  5 years of  the 
Auction date -0.0334493 -0.4775  
Economic Expectations – Survey Data 
General Economic 
Outlook for the current 
period compared to the 
previous 3 months, 3 
mo. % change -0.107535 -4.987 *** 
General Economic 
Outlook for the next 3 
months, 3 mo. % change 0.0920839 4.068 *** 
Outlook for Consumer 
Durables purchases in 0.0595645 7.718 *** 
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the current period, 3 
Mo. % change 
Probability of purchasing 
a a new car within the 
next 6 months, YoY % 
change  0.0255189 2.939 *** 
Probability of purchasing 
a a new car within the 
next 6 months, 3 mo. % 
change 0.161742 5.392 *** 
Probability of purchasing 
or constructing a new 
house within the next 12 
months, 3 mo. % change 0.14727 6.999 *** 
Probability of purchasing 
or constructing a new 
house within the next 12 
months, YoY % change -0.188993 -6.741 *** 
Probability of increased 
saving in the next six 
months, YoY % change -0.039679 -5.089 *** 
Outlook for changes in 
the price level in the next 
12 months, YoY % 
change over the current 
period -0.00975019 -3.518 *** 
Outlook for changes in 
the price level in the next 
12 months, 3 mo. % 
change over the current 
period -0.0123903 -2.163 ** 
 
Regression Statistics: 
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Heckit Model     Traditional Hedonic Price Model 
 
Total observations: 11212    R2 = 0.528944    
Censored observations: 4441 (39.6%)  Adjusted R2 = 0.521737 
sigma = 0.986662, rho = -0.215449   F-statistic (101, 6669) = 72.68258*** 
            Log-likelihood = -13866.80 
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
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APPENDIX  
 
Table A1. The Distribution of the Data on the Artists in the Sample  
(% of the total for the category) 
Variables % 
ALIVE: Alive = 1, Deceased = 0 43.31 
TURKISH: Turkish = 1, Foreign = 0 89.05 
Top 500 (T500) Turkish Artist = 1 62.96 
Not sufficient artist info or Anonymous 
(NOINFO) 
8.04  
Unknown Birthdate  7.43  
 % Full-Sample 
Death Effect Dummy 1 (DE1): Artist died 
within the 12- 
month period before the auction date 
 
 
1.43 
 
 
 
Turgut Atalay, Zahir Güvenli, 
Jülide Aılmaz, Gürdal Duyar, Nuri 
İyem, Şeref Bigalı, Ferit Apa, 
Mehmet Uygun, Kristin Saleri, 
Hasan Kavruk, Hamza İnanç, 
Mümtaz Yener, Asım İşler, Atilla 
Bayraktar, Fahir Aksoy 
Death Effect Dummy 2 (DE2): Artist died 
within the 5-year period before the auction 
date 
 
 
 
 
4.97 
 
 
 
 
Artists included in DE1 and: 
Abdullah Taktak, Asuilty Guyor, 
Avni Arbaş, Cahit Derman, İsmail 
Altınok, Lütfü Cülcül, Mustafa 
Turgut Tokad, Nazmi Yılmaz, 
Neşet Günal, Nihat Akyunak, 
Rafet Ekiz, Setrak Mıskçiyan, 
Simon Samsonian, Sirun Adın, 
Şükriye Dikmen, Theodore Weber, 
Timos 
 % Some Examples 
Top 500 Turkish artist, Born before 1900 10.98 
 
Hoca Ali Rıza, İbrahim Çallı, Sami 
Yetik, Osman Hamdi Bey, Eşref 
Üren 
Top 500 Turkish artist, Born between 1900 
and 1929 
27.25 
 
Nuri İyem, Mübin Orhon, 
Fahrelnisa Zeid, Fikret Mualla, 
Avni Arbaş, Fikret Mualla 
Top 500 Turkish artist, Born between 1930 
and 1959 
23.41 
 
Komet, Necdet Kalay, Serap 
Demirağ, Utku Varlık, Yusuf 
Taktak, Devrim Erbil 
Top 500 Turkish artist, Born after 1960  1.31 
 
Arzu Başaran, Mustafa Özel, Onay 
Akbaş, Gürhan Yücel, Bahar 
Kocaman 
Non-T500 Turkish artist, Born before 1900 5.26 
 
Nazmi Ziya, Diyarbakırlı Tahsin, 
Yüzbaşı Hidayet, Şerif Renkgörür, 
Üsküdarlı Mahmut 
Non-T500 Turkish artist, Born between 1900 
and 1929 
4.46 
 
Celal Uzel, Türkan Kıran, Nihat 
Akyunak, Hulusi Mercan, Afife 
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Ecevit 
Non-T500 Turkish artist, Born between 1930 
and 1959 
8.95 
 
Hüseyin Cahit Derman, Ayhan 
Türker, Canan Tolon, Ali Demir, 
Hüseyin Cahit Derman 
Non-T500 Turkish artist, Born after 1960 4.16 
 
Nuri Yakupoğlu, Sevinç Altan, 
Deniz Orkuş, Ebru Uygun, İsmail 
Ateş 
Foreign artist, Born before 1900  6.98 
 
Karl Karlovich Zommer, Fausto 
Zonaro, Albert Mille, Pablo 
Picasso, Amadeo Preziosi, 
Leonardo de Mango 
Foreign artist, Born between 1900 and 1929 1.27 
 
Alberto Giacometti, Thedore 
Weber, Kristin Saleri, Kazimierz 
Rubolowski, Salvador Dali 
Foreign artist, Born between 1930 and 1959 1.13 
 
Nikolai Saraphanov, Giovanna 
Barozzi, Jean Bastista Delarue, 
Kuzim Sergei, Louis Michel 
Hadengue 
Foreign artist, Born after 1960  0.21 
 
Mark Kostabi, Zümrüt Y. Radau, 
Guido Casaretto, Sergio Saez, 
Eduard Grützner 
Note: The totals may not add up to 100 due to rounding. 
 
Table A2. Positioning of the Works in the Auction and the Sales Ratios 
 Position in % brackets No. of Sold Works Total No .of 
Works 
Sales Ratio 
Decile 1   0 =< X < 10 824 1288 0.6398 
Decile 2 10 =< X < 20 873 1338 0.6525 
Decile 3 20 =< X < 30 725 1216 0.5962 
Decile 4 30 =< X < 30 713 1236 0.5769 
Decile 5 40 =< X < 40 706 1194 0.5913 
Decile 6 50 =< X < 60 690 1145 0.6026 
Decile 7 60 =< X < 70 669 1143 0.5853 
Decile 8 70 =< X < 80 721 1260 0.5722 
Decile 9 80 =< X < 90 813 1426 0.5701 
Decile 10 90 =< X =< 100 801 1621 0.4941 
No information  39 87 0.4483 
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